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ABSTRACT
In 2013, Tsai et al. cryptanalyzed Yeh et al. scheme and shown 
that Yeh et al., scheme is vulnerable to various cryptographic 
attacks and proposed an improved scheme. In this poster we will 
show that Tsai et al., scheme is also vulnerable to undetectable 
online password guessing attack, on success of the attack, the 
adversary can perform all major cryptographic attacks. As apart of 
our contribution, we have proposed an improved scheme which 
overcomes the defects in Tsai et al. and Yeh et al. schemes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.4.6, K.6.5
General Terms
Security 
Keywords
Multi-Server, Authentication, Multi-Server Authentication.
1. INTRODUCTION
In Tsai et al., scheme the malicious server Sj can perform 
undetectable online password guessing attack as follows. Guess 
PW of Ui as PW1, a11, compute Vi1 = h(PW1) and sends {IDi, 
EVi1(g
a11, r11)} to RC. On receiving the login request the RC 
retrieves Vi from Ri⊕h(IDi||x) and decrypts the request to get 
g
a11
, r11. RC computes EVi(g
c11) and sends {IDi , EVi(g
c11)} to 
Sj. On receiving the login reply Sj decrypts using Vi1 to get g
c11
and computes K11 = g
a11.c11
and sends the message {IDi, SIDj, 
EK11(IDi , SIDj , r11), EVj (g
b11
, H(EK11(IDi, SIDj, r11)), IDi , 
SIDj, r21)} to RC. Now RC performs following computations: 
Decrypt:: DVj (g
b11
, H(EK11(IDi , SIDj , r11)), IDi , SIDj, r21)) to 
get EK11(IDi, SIDj , r11) and computes ‘R’ = H(EK11(IDi, SIDj, 
r11)) and compares ‘R’ with the received value. If both are equal, 
RC proceeds further to compute K11 = g
a11.c11
and decrypts 
DK11(IDi , SIDj , r11) to get {IDi, SIDj , r11} and compares r11
received in login request with r11 received. If both are equal 
means, the original password Vi and password guessed Vi1 are 
same else the malicious server can repeat the same process. In our 
proposed scheme RC stores a variable ki which is known only to 
Ui and RC for each user Ui. Hence, in our scheme without
increase on computation and communications cost, we have 
restricted the malicious server to perform undetectable online 
password guessing attack, and other cryptographic attacks.
2. TSAI et al., PASSWORD –BASED MULTI SERVER AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
Figure 1. Graphical View of Tsai et al. scheme.
3. OFFLINE PASSWORD BASED GUESSING ATTACK ON TSAI et al., SCHEME.
                                                                                        
Figure 2.  Offline password guessing attack on TSai et al., scheme.
4. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
Figure 3.  Our Proposed Scheme. 
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